Der endlose Krieg in Bosnien und Herzegowina sowie in Teilen des serbisch besetzen Kroatien sollte uns an Moltke erinnern, der am 14. Mai 1890, in der Reichstagssitzung, gesagt hat: „Wenn ein Krieg zum Ausbruch kommt, so ist seine Dauer und sein Ende nicht abzusehen... Es kann siebenjähriger, es kann auch ein dreißigjähriger Krieg werden.” Wer hätte es glauben können, dass die Logik des Krieges in Kroatien, und später auch in Bosnien und Herzegowina, trotz einer Menge internationaler „Sachverständiger“ und „Experten“, immer wieder ein neues Kapitel des Grauens öffnen würde? Die Maastricht-Politiker und die Diplomaten der Vereinten Nationen scheinen so mit komplexen Verhältnissen des mitteleuropäischen und südosteuropäischen Multikultur-Mosaiks überfordert zu sein, so dass das Schlagwort „Balkansyndrom“ oft als ein nettes Alibi für ihr eigenes Nichtstun benutzt wird.
L’interminable guerre en Bosnie-Herzégovine et dans les régions de Croatie occupées par les Serbes voit actuellement se multiplier des souffrances affreuses. En même temps, la situation devient de plus en plus confuse, voire totalement incompréhensible, pour les observateurs extérieurs. Trois ans après l’éclatement violent de l’état hybride yougoslave, les organisations internationales ne semblent être d’accord ni sure les causes du conflit, ni sur les motifs de l’agresseur, ni sur les intérêts des victimes. Le formalisme juridique de l’ONU et les volte-face des médiateurs ajoutent encore à cette obscurité. Finalement, l’idée se répand que « toutes les parties sont responsables » du conflit, qu’il s’agisse des victimes ou de leurs agresseurs. On serait tenté de citer le juriste allemand Carl Schmitt, ou les travaux de Régis Debray pour comprendre pourquoi l’indécision de la classe politique européenne n’a pas contribué à la résolution rapide du conflit. Cette interprétation pessimiste du conflit nécessite au moins de mettre quelques détails en perspective, surtout après la récente déclaration de Genève sur une éventuelle reconnaissance mutuelle entre la Serbie et la Croatie. D’un côté, maints médiateurs internationaux, ainsi que quelques journalistes mal informés, exigent que le président croate Franjo Tudjman se livre à d’interminables tête à tête avec son homologue serbe, Slobodan Milosevic. De l’autre, maints politiciens et journalistes soupçonnent en même temps Tudjman d’utiliser ses rencontres avec Milosevic pour « comploter » secrètement contre les musulmans bosniaques. Le partage de la Bosnie-Herzégovine entre la Serbie et la Croatie n’a jamais été dans les intérêts géopolitiques de la Croatie. Si la Croatie avait voulu le dépeçage de la Bosnie-Herzégovine, elle n’aurait jamais été le premier pays dans le monde à avoir reconnu la souveraineté de ce pays. De plus, l’annexion des régions de la Herzégovine peuplées par une majorité de Croates n’aurait pas manqué de légitimer du même coup les appétits serbes dans les régions occupées de Croatie. C’est donc à l’ONU et à la CEE de définir leur rôle et de préciser aussi vite que possible les structures étatiques de la Bosnie-Herzégovine future. Or, l’ironie macabre de ce conflit veut que jusqu'à présent, chaque nouvelle résolution prise par l’ONU du point de vue du droit international ait annulé la précédente. Sur le terrain, les premières victimes de la guerre en Bosnie-Herzégovine, à savoir les musulmans bosniaques, cherchent aujourd’hui un ersatz de territoire pour compenser celui qui a été conquis par les envahisseurs serbes. Vu que la communauté internationale à peu fait pour endiguer l’agression serbe, les musulmans se retournent donc logiquement contre leurs anciens alliés croates. Il leur est en effet beaucoup plus facile de combattre les faibles positions croates en Bosnie centrale, que de recapture leurs positions conquises par les Serbes. Ceux qui doivent en payer les frais sont encore une fois les Croates bosniaques qui ont déjà perdu au cours de la dernière année 40% de leur territoire au profit des milices musulmanes. Les massacres de civils croates qui furent perpétrés par les milices musulmanes dans les villages croates Doljani, Krizancevo, Maljine et Uzdol, échappent curieusement à l’œil des divers medias étrangers. Pour saisir le caractère surréel de la situation en Bosnie-Herzégovine, on pourrait faire remarquer que la Croatie se charge actuellement de plus de 150 000 réfugiés musulmans bosniaques, lointains cousins de ceux qui combattent les Croates bosniaques ! Faut-il par ailleurs rappeler que la Croatie doit également s’occuper d’un demi-million de réfugiés croates chassées de leur foyer par les agresseurs serbes ? Que peut donc faire la Croatie à elle seule ? Depuis trois ans, le président Franjo Tudjman ne cesse de répéter que la guerre en Croatie et en Bosnie-Herzégovine doit être résolue par les moyes pacifiques et avec l’aide de l’ONU et de la CEE. En raison de volonté de coopération, la Croatie n’a pas manqué d’être l’objet de critiques diverses. Stigmatisée autrefois comme pays « fascinant », elle risque aujourd’hui d’être cataloguée comme pais « antimusulmans ». A-t-elle donc misé sur le mauvais cheval quand elle a confié ses aspirations démocratiques à l’Occident ?
Die Demonstrationen der serbischen Intellektuellen und Oppositionsparteien gegen Slobodan Milosevic, so lobenswert sie sein mögen, kommen leider zu spät. Die serbische Akademie der Kunst und Wissenschaft, die heute die Proteste anführt, hat eine sehr fragwürdige Geschichte. Die Akademie hat 1986 ein Memorandum entworfen, in dem die bekannten serbischen Akademiker die Schaffung Groß-Serbiens sowie die „ethnische Reinigung“ Kosovos empfahlen. Die serbische orthodoxe Kirche hat trotz ihrer neugefundenen Protesthaltung jahrzehntelang Stillschweigen und ein niedriges Profil vorgezogen. Sie hat nie die Repression gegen die Kosovo-Albaner verurteilt, und letztes Jahr hat sie mit keinem einzigen Wort die Invasion der jugoslawischen Armee in Kroatien kritisiert. Auch prominente serbische Intellektuelle waren fast alle stumm, als die jugoslawische Armee Dubrovnik bombardierte und Vukovar dem Erdboden gleichmachte. Der Wunsch der serbischen politischen und intellektuellen Klasse, alle serbischbesiedelten Gebiete in den Nachbarrepubliken Groß-Serbien einzuverleiben, kann gegenteilige Konsequenzen auch für die Serben haben. Wenn Serbien konsequent seine eigenen territorialen Ansprüche juridisch und historisch legitimieren will, sollte es auch Kosovo an Albanien, sowie einen Teil der Vojvodina an Ungarn übergeben. Mit ihrem Wahnwunsch, Groß-Serbien zu errichten, könnten alle Serben leicht in Klein-Serbien landen. Der Fall Jugoslawien weigt, dass die Multikulturutopien, wo immer sie sein mögen, nur mit Gewalt entstehen und bestehen können. Vielleicht lernt Amerika nach den Ereignissen in Los Angeles, das die Pathologie Jugoslawiens auch im eigenen Hause lauern kann. Vielleicht lernen das multikulturelle Marseille und Berlin etwas vom Kriege in Bosnien und Herzegowina.
Some members of the international community, along with some foreign media representatives, have recently criticised Croatia for its alleged mistreatment of Bosnian Muslims. Several details need to be put into perspective in order to comprehend this never-ending Balkan drama: 1. Croatia was the first country in Europe to recognise the sovereignty of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Given the important geopolitical position of this neighbouring state, it is in the paramount interest of Croatia to respect the integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In fact, it is Mr. Izetbegovic, not the Croats, who has just recently signed the de facto partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina in his agreement with the Serb side. On her part, Croatia has also strongly urged all Bosnian Croat military units to allow free safe passage to all United Nations humanitarian convoys. 2. On the one hand of the international community, along with some journalists, is constantly pushing Croatia’s President Franjo Tudjman to endlessly negotiate with Serbia’s leader Slobodan Milosevic: on the other, it accuses Tudjman of setting secret deals with Milosevic. The carve-up of Bosnia-Herzegovina into three distinct and separate states is not in the security interest of Croatia, given that the disappearance of Bosnia-Herzegovina would automatically legitimise Serbian territorial appetites and Serb illicit territorial acquisitions in neighbouring Croatia. 3. And in whose interest is it to keep this terrible conflict going on in neighbouring Bosnia? Contrary to many false assumptions, the Muslim side and its leader, President Alija Izetbegovic, are not so keen to see the conflict come to an end. The Muslim side must recompense its earlier territorial losses to the Serb aggressor by making now impossible demands to the much weaker Bosnian Croats. Ironically, instead of turning their anger on the real Serbian military threat, Bosnia’s Muslims prefer taking on Bosnia’s Croats, while at the same time portraying themselves as the only hapless victims in the Balkan conflict. As a grotesque irony of this conflict, neighbouring Croatia is currently housing more than 170,000 Muslim refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina, whose number has recently increased by over 50,000 Croats fleeing the Muslim military advances in central Bosnia-Herzegovina. 4. Apparently, many well-meaning European Community observers, as well as many foreign journalists, do not face insurmountable difficulties visiting Muslim areas and prisoners under Croatian control in southern Bosnia-Herzegovina, including the Croatian-held town of Mostar. Yet, they appear unable to make their way to over 150,000 Croats in central Bosnia, who have been encircled and shelled for several months by the Bosnian Muslim forces. 5. The Serb-held territories in Croatia are nominally under the UN jurisdiction. Yet the UN forces seldom attempt to stop the Serbian fighters from shelling nearby Croat towns and villages. Aside from dispensing much needed humanitarian aid, the UN forces in the Serb-occupied regions of Croatia should start finally implementing the numerous UN resolutions, and help the Croat government restore its full sovereignty within its internationally recognised borders. The Croatian government is doing its utmost to bring the bloody and complex Balkan conflict to an end. Yet, without strong and more forceful measures on the part of the UN and the EC, the conflict will only spread throughout the Balkans. To accuse the Croatian government of being equally responsible for this drama is an elegant to shrug off the UN and EC paralysis and failure to define the real aggressor. Instead of dealing with symptoms of the Balkan disease, the international community must first and foremost define the origin and cause of the disease, and treat the disease accordingly. Should they continue to fail, the stage will soon be set for more terrible conflicts to occur.
Your editorial, "Croatia’s Sellout," July 10, seemed t o have been prompted more by your desire for evenhandedness than by the desire to objectively analyze the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Unlike Serbia, Croatia recognized the sovereignty, independence, and inviolability of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In contrast to Serbian Army offensive actions in Bosnia, Croat troops are conducting defensive actions. The Bosnian government has repeatedly asked for international help. Consequently the republic of Croatia has lent support to refugees in Croatia. Does anybody expect Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina to preach pacifism – only to be routed and slaughtered, and later to be bewailed by vicarious United Nations world-improvers? Last year, when the Yugoslav Army attacked Croatia, Croats learned that the best way their new state can obtain recognition and deal with the aggressor is through military resistance. The decision by the Croats in Herzegovina to set up their own administrative region within Herzegovina must be put in perspective. This decision by no means suggests that Croats are carving up Bosnian territory. There has been no "secret" deal between Serbia and Croatia – as Serbian continuous shelling of Croat towns both in Herzegovina and Croatia demonstrates. By contrast, not a single town in Serbia has so far been attacked by Croat troops.
In the wake of the joint declaration in Geneva between President Franjo Tudjman of Croatia and Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia, some foreign journalists have jumped to the conclusion that such an agreement amounts to the creation of some sort of alliance against the Bosnian Muslims. Nothing could be further from the truth. The joint declaration is a small but important step in the possible normalization of relations between Serbia and Croatia. This breakthrough paves the way, we hope, for mutual recognition of internationally recognized borders. It may seem ironic that Croatia, a victim of Serbian aggression, is the first country to begin normalizing relations with Serbia, or what is left of Yugoslavia. This decision was not solely Croatia’s choice, but also that of the international community. Croatia and President Tudjman are doing their utmost to help restore peace in this part of Europe. Nonetheless, Croatia’s decision to sign this declaration in no way means that Croatia will abandon efforts to bring about a lasting peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. On the contrary, Croatia has been more than forthcoming with the Bosnian Muslims on the future structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Also bear in mind that Croatia is accommodating more than 150,000 Muslim Bosnian refugees, for whom most of the cost is covered by the Croatian government. Croatia and President Tudjman do not hold all the cards for peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Bosnian Serbs still control 70 percent of Bosnia’s territory, while it is the Bosnian Croats who have lost a considerable amount of territory to the Muslim forces since the breakup of their alliance.
The causes of the never-ending war in the Balkans could plausibly be attributed to [the] excessive legalism of international organizations, including the United Nations. Despite noble efforts to end the three-year-old conflict in the Balkans, the U.N., as well as other international actors, is still unable to speak with one voice. It is worth recalling that in 1991, when Yugoslavia began to fall apart, the republic of Croatia expected the European Community and the United Nations to accept its bid for independence, hoping that its recognition would stave off the looming Serbian military threat. In the absence of prompt international recognition, and due to its lack of firepower, Croatia could not put up credible deterrence against a Serbian land grab. Croatia had to wait six long months before it was finally recognized by all European Community members, and several more months before it finally joined the U.N. club. Meanwhile, it lost 27 percent of its territory to the invading “Yugoslav” Army and local Serb insurgents. Ironically, it was Serbia that, while trying to salvage Yugoslavia by force also destroyed it by force. While despairing whether or not the “premature” recognition of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, prompted by the Balkan bloodshed, one might also raise the question whether France, England, and America should have “prematurely” helped create, in 1919, the artificial Yugoslav state. The principles of “brotherhood and unity,” which were subsequently imposed by force on the Yugoslav constituent peoples in Josip Broz Tito’s Communist Yugoslavia could hardly mask profound cultural differences among diverse Yugoslav ethnic groups. In the former Yugoslavia, each ethnic group pretended to love another ethnic group, while secretly thinking of how to part company and go its own way. Had the international community been aware of this state of mind among the former Yugoslav constituent ethnic groups, much of the present chaos and inter-ethnic hatred could have been avoided. Over the past two years, the U.N. and other international actors have passed numerous resolutions calling on the Serbs to stop their aggression on neighboring Bosnia and Herzegovina. Today, as the surreal Balkan drama becomes more and more unbearable to Western prime-time viewers, some foreign observers are calling for the creation of a war crimes tribunal for those Balkan warlords suspected of committing war crimes. Yet the idea of the international war crimes tribunal, noble as it sounds, cannot be taken seriously. While Serb leaders Slobodan Milosevic and Radovan Karadzic are often being portrayed as “war criminals,” pressing them to attend multilateral talks with their Croat and Muslim counterparts, under the U.N. auspices, only provided legitimacy to the Serbian “ethnic cleansing.” The legal options of Croatia, the first victim of Serbian aggression, have been difficult since the day of Yugoslavia’s break-up. On the one hand, Croatian President Franjo Tudjman is expected to negotiate with his Serbian counterpart Slobodan Milosevic. On the other, he is suspected by some foreign observers of cutting secret deals with Mr. Milosevic. The war in the former Yugoslavia, which began in 1991 as a limited war of Serbian aggression against unarmed Croatia, has now turned into protracted no-war-no-peace stalemate, with ominous consequences for all of Europe. The well-meaning indecisiveness of the U.N., followed by the lack of consensus among world powers, may only be the first chapter in this bloody European drama.
The race for victim status in Bosnia-Herzegovina appears to be over. The Serbs, as the main aggressors and initial perpetrators of “ethnic cleansing” hardly qualify. The international press has obviously decided that the Croats do not qualify either, despite the fact that the Bosnian Croats have lost considerable territory to the Moslems since the break-up of their alliance. The Moslems seem to have realised, after months of hope, that the international community is unwilling to help them take on their real enemies, the Serbs. Consequently, they have turned on their former allies, the Croats. This is clearly demonstrated by the fact that the lines between the Croats and Moslems have moved exclusively in the Moslem’s favour, resulting in more than 100,000 Croatian refugees and displaced persons from Bosnia-Herzegovina. While the Press and international organisations have free access to Moslem fighters in Croat POW camps – thanks to the vigorous intervention of Croatia’s Foreign Minister, Mr. Mate Granic – the fate of thousands of Croats in similar Moslem camps remains unknown. The current goals of the Moslem side have been made clear by their spokesman, Chuck Sudetic, recently quoted in the New York Times: “The international community will recognise our right to the territories we win. The international community has said in no uncertain terms that it is ready to legitimise the acquisition of territory by force, and that’s the way it will be in the future.” He went on to state that while the Serbs were too strong to fight against, the Croats were weak. Unfortunately, it is this recent Moslem calculation which has precipitated Croat-Moslem fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina, no Croatian aggression. Fighting between Moslems and the Croats would never have erupted had the international community reacted promptly to early Serbian aggression against both of those communities. Maybe by the time this conflict spreads throughout the Balkans, Europe and the world will finally figure out who the real culprit is.
One must agree with Georges Sorel that political myths have a long and durable life. For 74 years the Yugoslav state drew its legitimacy from the spirit of Versailles and Yalta, as well as from the Serb-inspired pan-Slavic mythology. By carefully manipulating the history of their constituent peoples while glorifying their own, Yugoslav leaders managed to convince the world that Yugoslavia was a “model multiethnic state.” Many global-minded pundits in the West followed suit and made a nice career preaching the virtues of the Yugoslav multi-ethnic pot. By tirelessly vaunting the Yugoslav model, scores of starry-eyed Western academics gave, both pedagogically and psychologically, additional legitimacy to artificial Yugoslavia. In 1991, faced with massive geopolitical tremors, stretching from Siberia to Spain, the Yugoslav mythology began cracking up, and with it, its multiethnic mystique. The sudden beginning of the democratization of Yugoslavia led, naturally, to the country’s demise, the bloody postscript to which is yet to unfold.
In his interesting piece, “Misreading Yugoslavia” (July 8), Dejan Kovacevic, emphasizes the ethnic roots of the Yugoslav crisis but seems oblivious to huge ideological differences between the Yugoslav republics. Communist-dominated Serbia and Montenegro are the two republics that are least interested in large-scale market reforms for fear of losing control over the federal bureaucracy and army. Although the records of Slovenia and Croatia are far from perfect, these republics have made bold steps in the direction of market reforms and safeguarding the rights of their minorities. Kovacevic’s allegations that 700,000 ethnic Serbs were killed by Fascist Croats during World War II are reminiscent of the decades-old Yugoslav propaganda whose purpose was to discredit Croatia’s claims for an independent homeland. World War II in Yugoslavia was a messy affair, involving a dozen different factionsm each with an impressive record of butchery. Of course, with the dissolution of communism, some of these exaggerated war casualties are bound to come under close scrutiny. In the long run, neither side in Yugoslavia will benefit from manipulating their war dead. Kovacevic should have also looked at the record of 45 years of Communist Yugoslavia in which Serbs played a dominant role in the secret police, federal bureaucracy and the army. Although Serbs make up 37 percent of the Yugoslav population, 76 percent of Yugoslav army officers are of Serbian origin. In independent-minded Croatia, at least until last year, Serbs made up a staggering 67 percent of the police force. Lastly, it is unwarranted to blame Croatia or Slovenia for the breakup of Yugoslavia, as some recent news reports have suggested. Ironically, the most expedient destroyers of Yugoslavia have been the Serbian leadership, under Slobodan Milosevic, and the federal army – both of which have had a hard time adjusting to changes in Eastern Europe. As long as the threat of the federal army looms large on the Yugoslav horizon, any meaningful dialogue between the Yugoslav republics is doomed to fail.