Even with their eulogy of universalism, as Serge Latouche has recently noted, Westerners have, nonetheless, secured the most com¬fortable positions for themselves. Although they have now retreated to the back stage of history, vicariously, through their humanism, they still play the role of the undisputable masters of the non-white¬-man show. Continue reading “History and Decadence: Spengler’s Cultural Pessimism Today (part 2/2)”
Category: History
History and Decadence: Spengler’s Cultural Pessimism Today (part 1/2)
Oswald Spengler (1880-1936) exerted considerable influence on European conservatism before the Second World War. Although his popularity waned somewhat after the war, his analyses, in the light of the disturbing conditions in the modern polity, again seem to be gaining in popularity. Recent literature dealing with gloomy post¬modernist themes suggests that Spengler’s prophecies of decadence may now be finding supporters on both sides of the political spectrum. Continue reading “History and Decadence: Spengler’s Cultural Pessimism Today (part 1/2)”
Vilfredo Pareto and Political Irrationality
Few political thinkers have stirred so much controversy as Franco-Italian sociologist and economist Vilfredo Pareto (1848-1923). In the beginning of the twentieth century, Pareto exerted a considerable influence on European conservative thinkers, although his popularity rapidly declined after the Second World War. The Italian Fascists who used and abused Pareto’s intellectual legacy were probably the main cause of his subsequent fall into oblivion.
Continue reading “Vilfredo Pareto and Political Irrationality”
“De l’esprit communautaire et communiste à l’étatisme fragile: le drame de l’ex-post-Yougoslavie” (Catholica ~ Hiver 1997-1998, Nr. 93)
Lorsque l’on analyse un pays éclectique comme l’ex-Yougoslavie, on est tenté d’utiliser une méthode éclectique. En 1991, un concours de circonstances diverses et convergentes a provoqué l’éclatement du pays, prélude à la guerre entre les principaux acteurs : Serbes, Croates et Musulmans bosniaques. Lors de l’agression grande-serbe menée par l’armée yougoslave contre la Croatie, et plus tard, lors de la guerre interethnique en Bosnie-Herzégovine, et après les Accords de Dayton, dont l’architecte fut le gouvernement américain en 1995, une multitude d’analyses sur l’origine du conflit ont vu le jour. Continue reading ““De l’esprit communautaire et communiste à l’étatisme fragile: le drame de l’ex-post-Yougoslavie” (Catholica ~ Hiver 1997-1998, Nr. 93)”
Der Balkankrieg – im Westen missverstanden (den 29 Januar 1994 ~ Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung)
Der endlose Krieg in Bosnien und Herzegowina sowie in Teilen des serbisch besetzen Kroatien sollte uns an Moltke erinnern, der am 14. Mai 1890, in der Reichstagssitzung, gesagt hat: „Wenn ein Krieg zum Ausbruch kommt, so ist seine Dauer und sein Ende nicht abzusehen… Es kann siebenjähriger, es kann auch ein dreißigjähriger Krieg werden.” Wer hätte es glauben können, dass die Logik des Krieges in Kroatien, und später auch in Bosnien und Herzegowina, trotz einer Menge internationaler „Sachverständiger“ und „Experten“, immer wieder ein neues Kapitel des Grauens öffnen würde? Die Maastricht-Politiker und die Diplomaten der Vereinten Nationen scheinen so mit komplexen Verhältnissen des mitteleuropäischen und südosteuropäischen Multikultur-Mosaiks überfordert zu sein, so dass das Schlagwort „Balkansyndrom“ oft als ein nettes Alibi für ihr eigenes Nichtstun benutzt wird.
Continue reading “Der Balkankrieg – im Westen missverstanden (den 29 Januar 1994 ~ Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung)”
La logique du pire dans les Balkans ( 07.03.1994 ~ Tribune Libre Le Journal de Montréal )
L’interminable guerre en Bosnie-Herzégovine et dans les régions de Croatie occupées par les Serbes voit actuellement se multiplier des souffrances affreuses. En même temps, la situation devient de plus en plus confuse, voire totalement incompréhensible, pour les observateurs extérieurs.
Trois ans après l’éclatement violent de l’état hybride yougoslave, les organisations internationales ne semblent être d’accord ni sure les causes du conflit, ni sur les motifs de l’agresseur, ni sur les intérêts des victimes. Continue reading “La logique du pire dans les Balkans ( 07.03.1994 ~ Tribune Libre Le Journal de Montréal )”
The Fear of More Terrible Conflicts in the Balkans (21 September 1993 ~ The Guardian)
Some members of the international community, along with some foreign media representatives, have recently criticised Croatia for its alleged mistreatment of Bosnian Muslims. Several details need to be put into perspective in order to comprehend this never-ending Balkan drama:
1. Croatia was the first country in Europe to recognise the sovereignty of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Given the important geopolitical position of this neighbouring state, it is in the paramount interest of Croatia to respect the integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
In fact, it is Mr. Izetbegovic, not the Croats, who has just recently signed the de facto partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina in his agreement with the Serb side. On her part, Croatia has also strongly urged all Bosnian Croat military units to allow free safe passage to all United Nations humanitarian convoys. Continue reading “The Fear of More Terrible Conflicts in the Balkans (21 September 1993 ~ The Guardian)”
Yugoslavia: The End of Communism, The Return of Nationalism (20 April 1991 ~ America National Catholic weekly)
The end of communism in Yugoslavia has brought the return of nationalism and a host of new problems steeped in ethnic roots, said Tomislav Sunic, a Croatian who now teaches in Juniata College.
As a result, he believes, “representative democracy…as attractive and functional a model as it may be in the relatively homogeneous societies of the West, has, in the fractured Yugoslavian state, little chance of success. Continue reading “Yugoslavia: The End of Communism, The Return of Nationalism (20 April 1991 ~ America National Catholic weekly)”
Yugo into History ( July 17th, 1991 ~ The Pittsburgh Post – Gazette)
In his interesting piece, “Misreading Yugoslavia” (July 8), Dejan Kovacevic, emphasizes the ethnic roots of the Yugoslav crisis but seems oblivious to huge ideological differences between the Yugoslav republics.
Communist-dominated Serbia and Montenegro are the two republics that are least interested in large-scale market reforms for fear of losing control over the federal bureaucracy and army. Continue reading “Yugo into History ( July 17th, 1991 ~ The Pittsburgh Post – Gazette)”
The Yugoslav Mythology: A Multicultural Pathology (August 1993 ~ Chronicles)
One must agree with Georges Sorel that political myths have a long and durable life. For 74 years the Yugoslav state drew its legitimacy from the spirit of Versailles and Yalta, as well as from the Serb-inspired pan-Slavic mythology. By carefully manipulating the history of their constituent peoples while glorifying their own, Yugoslav leaders managed to convince the world that Yugoslavia was a “model multiethnic state.” Many global-minded pundits in the West followed suit and made a nice career preaching the virtues of the Yugoslav multi-ethnic pot. By tirelessly vaunting the Yugoslav model, scores of starry-eyed Western academics gave, both pedagogically and psychologically, additional legitimacy to artificial Yugoslavia. Continue reading “The Yugoslav Mythology: A Multicultural Pathology (August 1993 ~ Chronicles)”